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Considering that a triage related task may essentially make-or-break a digital investigation
and the fact that a number of triage tools are freely available online but there is currently
no mature framework for practically testing and evaluating them, in this paper we put
three open source triage tools to the test. In an attempt to identify common issues,
strengths and limitations we evaluate them both in terms of efﬁciency and compliance to
published forensic principles. Our results show that due to the increased complexity and
wide variety of system conﬁgurations, the triage tools should be made more adaptable,
either dynamically or manually (depending on the case and context) instead of main-
taining a monolithic functionality.
ª 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Triage is a term deriving from medicine. According to
the Free Merriam-Webster dictionary it is deﬁned as “the
sorting of and allocation of treatment to patients and
especially battle and disaster victims according to a system
of priorities designed to maximize the number of survi-
vors”. In a similar manner, in incident response (Brownlee
and Guttman, 1998) triage is deﬁned as the stage where a
security expert assesses an incoming report about a secu-
rity incident, prioritizes it, relates it to other ongoing in-
cidents and deems whether the report is valid. From these
deﬁnitions it can be evident that the overall success of a
digital investigation is heavily inﬂuenced by the early ac-
tions of the ﬁrst responder. Correct prioritization and
handling of the live system may offer the key to an
encrypted partition, or might reveal the valuable remote IP.les), achrysanthou@
os).
. All rights reserved.In this paper we used threewidely available open source
triage tools as a vehicle to study and understand the issues
surrounding digital triage processes. We study the effort
required and the practical challenges a responder may face
and evaluate these tools against the requirements set out
by a published practice guide for digital forensics. Having
employed some of these tools in real case situations where
we had to modify them on the ﬁeld, we included a sec-
ondary goal in this paper which is to propose ways of
improving these tools.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
present the current state of the art and research directions
on triage tool requirements. In Section 3 we describe the
methodology for our empirical evaluation and introduce
the three tools. Section 4 reports on the evaluation of the
tools with further discussion on their advantages and
drawbacks summarized in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
The evaluation of the tools is continued in Section 7, where
we assess the tools’ compliance to an appropriate forensics
principle. Finally, Sections 8 and 9 conclude with further
suggestions, discussion and future work.
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When an incident is being reported, digital forensics
processes are called upon to examine the incident, collect
and analyze digital evidence in order to assess the nature of
the incident, identify a potential perpetrator and maybe
establish whether a cyber-crime has been committed. A bug
that causes a server to hang will be an incident response
scenario where no human perpetrator is actually involved.
However in a website defacement case for example, the
collection of evidence from the underlying live system may
be necessary, since potentially malicious processes may still
be resident in memory. In such case digital triage forensics
will be required in order to investigate the digital crime
scene and collect evidence based on the order of volatility, as
deﬁned in RFC 3227 (Brezinski and Killalea, 2002). “Digital
Triage Forensics (DTF) is deﬁned as a procedural model for
the investigation of digital crime scenes including both
traditional crime scenes and the more complex battleﬁeld
crime scenes” (Pearson and Watson, 2010). Rogers et al.
(2006) deﬁne a computer forensics triage model (CFFTPM)
as “investigative processes that are conducted within the
ﬁrst few hours of an investigation and provide information
used during the suspect interview and search execution
Phase”. The goal is to identify useful evidence while at the
crime scene in order to guide the investigators and help
them identify both other potential evidence, whichmight be
“hidden in plain sight”, as well as assess the perpetrator’s
“danger to society”. As triage is part of the digital forensics
life cycle and involves the collection of evidence that may be
later presented in a court of law, the adherence of all
employed triage tools and processes to forensic principles
ensuring the admissibility of the collected evidence is non
questionable. A typical and well developed set of principles
is described in the well known Association of Chief Police
Ofﬁcers (ACPO) Good Practice Guide for Computer Based
Electronic Evidence (ACPO, 2008). The guide comprises of
four Principles which are rather generic in order to be easily
understood and followed in many circumstances. More
speciﬁcally, Principle 1 states that “No action taken by law
enforcement agencies or their agents should change data
held on a computer or storage media which may subse-
quently be relied upon in court.” However, where a live
system is involved or the need arises to access original data
held on a computer or on storage media Principle 2 states
that the investigator accessing the live systemor the original
data “must be competent to do so and be able to give evi-
dence explaining the relevance and the implications of his
actions”. In each and every case an audit trail of all processes
applied to computer-based electronic evidence must be
created andpreserved (Principle 3). Consequently the digital
forensics triage tools have to be able to keep an audit trail of
their actions, so that a) an independent third party can
follow them up and end up with the same result b) the
investigator can explain how these tools are relevant to his
investigation and how they changed the examined system
without setting his investigation in danger. At the same time
these tools have to be able to collect evidence beginning
from the volatile to the less volatile (Brezinski and Killalea,
2002) while collecting as many forensic artifacts as neces-
sary. A good resource on potential forensic artifacts is theForensicArtifacts.com database and SANS resources such as
the Sans-Digital-Forensics-and-Incident-Response-Poster-
2012 (Lee, 2012) or Sans forensic cheat sheets, where an
investigator canﬁndawide variety of evidence that he has to
look for, depending always on the type of investigation (in an
internet-related crime for example the focus would be on
the suspect’s browsing habits and history), as well as the
tools he can utilize (in the internet-related crime example
Nirsoft’s web browsers’ tools package might be useful).
Rogers et al. (2006) in their proposed triage process
model highlight the importance of prioritization prior to
moving into the collection of the various system and user
data. Emphasis is given on the data that have short time to
live suchas routing tables, processes and temporaryﬁles. The
authors conclude that forensic examiners need a repertoire
of tools as there is no tool that can weight all possible tech-
nical and legal considerations a ﬁrst respondermay face in a
speciﬁc case. This suggests that the triage toolwill need to be
ﬂexible and maintain the ability to respond to the evidence
during collection by changing its acquisition behavior.
An important trait of a triage tool is the requirement to
collect data in a relatively short time window. This is often
overlooked in practice as the tools are becoming complex in
order to preserve as much information as possible, later to
be used in analysis. Horsman et al. (2011) attribute this
drawback to the fact that triage tools are descendants from
traditional forensic tools that are designed to perform a
post mortem analysis. We argue that in order to achieve a
suitable tradeoff between the speed of the triage process
and the appropriateness of the collected data, the triage
tool needs to have adaptiveness capabilities. SPEKTOR
triage tool for example attempts to support some degree
of automation, but this is done in order to be used by
people with no particular technical abilities. This is in clear
violation of ACPO’s second principle and as such we
consider it to be a poor practice. In fact, we argue that a
triage tool will need to support automation in order to
simplify the ﬁrst responder’s work, but this should not be
done by sparing the expertise and skills of the responder.
A key dilemma in incident response is the decision to
perform a complete memory acquisition versus a live
response. Memory acquisition can be very informative but
is rather slow. In addition, memory acquisition will take a
snapshot of the execution state of the system and the an-
alyst will not have the opportunity to perform some further
acquisition based on the ﬁndings. Yet, hardware evolution
leads to ever increasing memory sizes suggesting that a
memory image may provide information of past and
completed processes which cannot be mined through live
response tools (Aljaedi et al., 2011). Live response on the
other hand can be very effective if the ﬁrst responder is well
prepared on the underlying case. However, it requires a
portfolio of tools that are typically executed from a script. In
addition the tools need to be conﬁgured in order to be
compatible with the suspect system. Waits et al. (2008)
conclude that both approaches should be followed, with
the incident response tools fulﬁlling the role of the triage
phase, collecting the minimal information possible in order
to allow further planning. Once more, minimal information
requires well preparation and customization of the triage
tool.
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needs to balance a number of requirements in terms of per-
formance, complexity and adaptability. In the following sec-
tions we put three open-source triage tools to the test, assess
their behavior and reach to a series of conclusions as to their
ability to meet the expectations of the ﬁrst responder.
3. Methodology
For our primary research we tested the TriageIR,
TR3Secure and Kludge triage/incident response tools. We
examined their behavior in various Microsoft Windows
operating systems and compared the results that they
produce. We focused on Microsoft’s Windows operating
systems as, according to statistics, MS Windows type OS
remains the most popular operating system used by home
users (Netmarketshare, 2012).
For our primary research we setup a testbed that
included machines running various MS Windows OS that a
typical home end user would use.
3.1. Testbed setup procedure
The base host operating systemwas Windows 7 SP1 64-
Bit with Quad Core, 8 GB RAM and 2 TB Hard Disk. On this
Host VMware Player 8 was installed. Subsequently 8 virtual
machines (VMs) were created according to the speciﬁca-
tions summarized in Table 1.
Initially each created VM was loaded with a default
installation of a Windows OS system (XP SP3 32 bit, XP SP2
64 bit, 7 32 bit, 7 64 bit, 7 SP1 32 bit, 7 SP1 64 bit, 8 32 bit
and 8 64 bit). Following the installation of the OS on the
VM, we installed Sandboxie 3.74, in order to be able to
execute the triage tools in sandboxed environment. Sand-
boxie could be installed on all VMs except Windows XP
64 bit, where we encountered an incompatibility, as
Sandboxie is not supported in such OS. As a next step we
copied TriageIR v.79, Kludge-3.20110223 and TR3Secure on
our “E: disk” which served as an external USB drive
following our test scenario. This is a typical setting where
the forensic examiner or ﬁrst responder introduces an
external USB drive to the system in order to run his triage
tools and collect the incident data. Furthermore, in Win-
dows 7 64 bit and Windows 8 64 bit we had to modify
Sandboxie’s conﬁguration ﬁle (Sabdboxie.ini) and change
the value of DropAdminRights from y to n, in order to be
able to run some programs that are part of the triage tools
and can only produce results if run under administrator
privileges. This setting is required due to changes in the
kernel of Windows 64 bit operating systems. It should be
noted that “DropAdminRights is a sandbox setting in Sand-
boxie.ini, which speciﬁes whether Sandboxie will strip
Administrator rights from programs running in the sandbox”.
Our testbed is depicted in Fig. 1 below.
3.2. Testing triage toolsTable 1
Virtual machine hardware speciﬁcations.
Network
mode





Bridge 60 GB 10 GB 1 GB 2All tools were tested with all their options enabled and
in two different execution modes; sandboxed environment
and “normal” execution. We utilized a sandboxed envi-
ronment in order to ﬁnd out which ﬁles are created in the
examined system’s hard disk and investigate how the
integrity of the examined system is being affected. We
executed the tools in “normal” execution mode in order to
see how the tools actually perform when not restricted in
an isolated “sandboxed” environment. For the Windows 7
and Windows 8 OS (32 bit and 64 bit) it was necessary to
enable for all the tools the “Run as administrator” option, as
UAC prevented some programs, such as win32dd.exe and
Memoryze.exe (programs that image the system’s memory
in dd format) called by the tools, from running correctly.
3.2.1. TriageIR v.0.79
Theﬁrst tool thatwe testedwasTriageIRv.0.79.According
to the documentation manual, TriageIR needs the following
tools added in a folder named “tools”, residing in the pro-
gram’s folder, in order for it to run correctly. These tools are:
a)DumpItmemoryutility, b) Sysinternals Suite, c) RegRipper,
d) md5deep and sha1deep, e) 7Zip Command Line.
The “tools” folder structure should look like as in Fig. 2.
After all the tools were placed in the respective folders
we executed the “Triage – Incident Response.exe”. The tool
provides 6 tabs – “pages” containing a variety of options
concerning System Information (see Fig. 3), Network in-
formation, and so forth. In order to fully assess the tool’s
functionality we executed it with all its options marked in
our two test modes.
In the sandboxed environment TriageIR produced some
errorswhen it tried to load somedrivers (ex. thewin32dd.sys
used by win32dd.exe in order to create a memory dump).
This behavior is normal, as “programs running under the
supervision of Sandboxie are stripped of privileges required
to start drivers”,1 thus resulting in lessdatabeingcollected, as
the tools associated with these drivers and services do not
function properly (the tools crash). In normal mode the tool
executed smoothly in every different operating system and
collected incident data in a folder that is automatically
created. This folder is in the same locationwherewe execute
theTriage– IncidentResponse.exe,which inourcase isonthe
E:disk. The tool failedonly inWindows8OS64bit,where the
win64dd.exe program cannot be loaded resulting in the
system’s memory image not being collected. However we
observed that win64dd.exe stops failing if the execution of
TriageIR is interrupted by the user once or twice and then
executed again (always as Administrator or with UAC
disabled). We conjecture that this problem exists in Win-
dows864bit due tochanges in theoperatingsystem’skernel.
3.2.2. TR3Secure
Next in our tests was the TR3Secure data collection
script. The tool uses a .bat script to call a series of tools
that are either native Windows tools, located in the Win-
dows\System32 folder, or tools that need to be downloaded
from the Internet and placed into a folder named “tools”,
which resides in the tool’s folder (Fig. 4). Additionally, a text1 http://www.sandboxie.com/index.php?SBIE2103.
Fig. 1. Triage testbed setup.
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speciﬁc commands in separate lines (list disk, list volume)
needs to be created in the “tools” folder with speciﬁc
commands placed on separate lines. The “tools” folder
structure is depicted in Fig. 5.
We carried out our testing procedure selecting option 4
from the tool’s menu (see Fig. 6) in order to use all available
capabilities. We used a slightly modiﬁed version of the
tool’s .bat script, which entailed some minor corrections
(see Appendix A.2).
The .bat script met most expectations in all operating
systems, but we noticed some issues in 64-bit systems,Fig. 2. TriageIR v.0.7as some of the utilities invoked by the tools are not
compatible with such systems. In addition we had to
modify the code in this script relating to the path of the
tools in Windows 7 and Windows 8 32-bit and 64-bit
in order for it to succeed in locating the tools. It
should be noted though that the script will not need
such code modiﬁcation if it is run through a trusted
command prompt shell – that is a shell running from
the investigator’s USB drive. In 64-bit operating
systems a memory image could not be collected possibly
due to the fact that Memoryze is not supported in a 64-
bit OS.9 Tools Folder.
Fig. 3. TriageIR v.79 GUI.
Fig. 4. TR3Secure main folder structure.
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Lastly, we tested Kludge-3.20110223. Kludge is created
with the idea of being run remotely through a network by
using the administrative shares in the target pc. In this way,
it copies all the ﬁles required by the tool to the remote
computer and then it runs them in order to collect the
required data. This could be considered a poor digital fo-
rensics practice as the tool makes many modiﬁcations to
the hard disk of the remote computer. Additionally, if
remote administrative shares are disabled in the Windows
remote system then the tool cannot be executed without
the investigator enabling them. Thus, in order to keep our
initial setup, which entailed running triage tools from an
external USB drive and the investigation data being saved
in the same drive, we modiﬁed the Kludge.bat ﬁle. This .bat
ﬁle is the tool’s main executable ﬁle and is located in the
kludge-3.20110223.zip ﬁle. The kludge-3.20110223.zip ﬁle
contains the kludge.zip ﬁle, which, as the tool is designed,
is uploaded to the remote machine and afterwards unzip-
ped to a temp folder (C:\WINDOWS\Temp\analysis\).
Following our modiﬁcations the script could run from our
external USB disk without any issues and store the
collected incident data to the same disk (see Fig. 7 and
Appendix A.1 for a link to download our modiﬁed code).
From there onwards, the procedure we followed did not
differ from the other two tools described earlier.2 See http://help.papertrailapp.com/kb/conﬁguration/conﬁguring-
remote-syslog-from-windows for examples on how to remotely log
windows OS.4. Results
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the triage tools
with respect to the order of volatility ﬁrstly we have todeﬁne what the order of volatility is for a typical system,
based on RFC3227 (Brezinski and Killalea, 2002), and sec-
ondly we have to deﬁne each scale in the order of volatility
hierarchy. CPU registers and cache represent the most
volatile state of data as these locations change most
frequently (typically in an order of milliseconds). Memory
is the source of a wealth of information such as running
processes, open connections, thus it is best that memory is
imaged with minimum alterations. Next in line are data
kept in the memory such as process tables, which can help
direct an investigation, when a “suspicious” process is
noted. A temporary ﬁle system can be deﬁned as a ﬁle
location, such as the Windows\Temp folder, where pro-
grams load temporary ﬁles, which are later on deleted or
“forgotten” when the programs terminate. Storage media
such as hard disks contain a wealth of information and are
not altered as easily as the previous described items.
Remote logging data is data that can be collected, for
example, from IDS sensors or from the examined system
itself and can help the investigator identify what the sys-
tem under examinationwas doing at the time of acquisition
or before. As these data reside in different devices, it is not
so easy to be altered either by the investigator’s tools or by
malicious software running in the system under examina-
tion.2 Physical conﬁguration and network topology
constitute more long term and less volatile data that can be
gathered at a later stage as they are not so changeable. The
Fig. 5. TR3Secure “tools” folder structure.
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In Table 2we present a consolidated viewof the incident
data that these tools were able to collect as part of the
triage process. The table column headers represent the
order of volatility scale, while the row headers represent
the tested tools.
As depicted in Table 2, quite expectedly none of the tools
collect evidence from registers and cache, since collecting
this type of data maybe has barely some meaning in triage
processes. This in part has to do with the fact that the
content of CPU registers, for example, is difﬁcult to be
analyzed. All of the tools collect the routing table and the
ARP cache, whilst preserving other data such as Netbios-
related data (general information and sessions), active
connections, network adapter information, DNS informa-
tion and other. All of the tools collect signiﬁcant amount of
information on processes, such as running processes and
process ﬁle handles. TR3Secure collects kernel statistics,
while all the tools collect information relating to the kernel
build. All of the tools image the system’s memory, whilst
preserving Prefetch ﬁles. Two of the tools (TriageIR, Kludge)
collect registry ﬁles, in unprocessed format (.reg, .dat, .hiv,
.log ﬁles) and in processed format (.txt ﬁles produced using
Regripper). All tools collect data on users’ activity (locally-
logged-on-users, active-logon-sessions), whereas two of
them (TriageIR, TR3Secure) collect clipboard contents. In
addition TriageIR also collects recent and jump lists ﬁles
and Kludge collects NTFS data streams.
With regards to temporary ﬁle system acquisition, two
of the tools (TriageIR, Kludge) collect system event logs
(.evt ﬁles), with one of them acquiring .evtx ﬁles also. In
practice the tools only collect .evt event logs, since during
our tests TriageIR failed to collect any .evtx event log ﬁles
(in Windows 7 or Windows 8 OS). In addition Kludge alsocollects antivirus logs pertaining to speciﬁc vendors
(McAfee and Symantec) and sometimes speciﬁc software
versions. Acquiring a hard disk image has no meaning
during the triage process, as a hard disk image is something
that needs to be analyzed later in a lab, with the same
applying to archival media.
Regarding remote logging and monitoring data, TriageIR
collects open shared ﬁles information, whereas TR3Secure
collects information on remotely-logged-on-users and
remote-users-ip-addresses. Concerning physical conﬁgura-
tion and network topology, all tools collect a variety of data
on system conﬁguration (hardware and software-wise).
In Table 3 we summarize the tool effectiveness for every
operating system. A tool is considered “effective” if it per-
forms without any errors and collects all the data according
to the prescription of the order of volatility. A tool is
considered “medium effective” if it produces a few errors,
when executed, but collects most of the data that the order
of volatility prescribes. A tool is considered “less effective”
if it produces a large number of errors when executed. A
tool is considered “ineffective” if it fails to collect vital ev-
idence (memory for instance) that the order of volatility
prescribes. As depicted above, TriageIR is deemed “medium
effective” in all operating systems as it produces a few er-
rors during execution resulting in some incident data not
being collected. It is worth noting that TriageIR is not
Windows 8 ready as it encounters problems in some of the
utilities (win64dd.exe, at.exe) that it uses due to depreca-
tion or incompatibility of these utilities with the latter OS.
TR3Secure is deemed “medium effective” in 32-bit oper-
ating systems and “ineffective” in 64-bit operating systems,
as in 64-bit OS it fails to acquire the system’s memory. It is
worth noting that TR3Secure collects less data than the
other two triage tools. Kludge is deemed “medium effec-
tive” in Windows XP 32-bit operating system and “less
Fig. 6. TR3Secure Main Menu.
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“Hobocopy” included in the downloadable Kludge package
and used to copy, for example, event logs, is not supported
in OS other than Windows XP 32-bit. Thus, a signiﬁcant
amount of incident data is not collected.
In Table 4 a consolidated view of the modiﬁcations
performed by each tool on the registry and ﬁle system of
the corresponding OS is presented. All the modiﬁcations
were recorded by using a) Buster Sandbox Analyzer 1.87
(BSA) in conjunction with Sandboxie and b) Sandboxie in
a standalone setting. The number of modiﬁcations depicted
below is a rough estimate as Sandboxie itself reports that,
for example, “Windows may store copies of programs ﬁles in
the Prefetch folder even when the programs were executed
under Sandboxie”,3 which means that BSA will not log ﬁles
such as Prefetch as part of the ﬁle system modiﬁcations.
The same applies to event log and potentially other ﬁles. It
is worthwhile noting that the modiﬁed version of Kludge
was the most consistent over all systems and the most
“forensically friendly” of all three tools. More information
on the critical modiﬁcations can be found in the Sandbox
analyzer log snippets in Appendix C.
5. Advantages
5.1. TriageIR 0.79
TriageIR collects information about the examined
computer’s startup process which can be proven useful for
malware analysis. Speciﬁcally, it utilizes the “wmic startup
list full” command which “shows a whole bunch of stuff
useful in malware analysis, including all ﬁles loaded at Startup
and the reg keys associated with autostart” (Skoudis, 2006).
Additionally it locates and copies all usrclass.dat ﬁles, ﬁles
that represent each user’s proﬁle settings, by using
sleuthkit’s iﬁnd and icat commands. Moreover the tool rips
all registry hives, bymeans of the Regripper utility. Another3 http://www.sandboxie.com/index.php?PrivacyConcerns.advantage of TriageIR is the fact that it produces MD5 and
SHA-1 hashes of evidence ﬁles (logs, Prefetch, recent links,
jump lists and registry ﬁles). This functionality can be used
to prove the integrity of the evidence data. Finally, the tool
creates a compressed ﬁle of the produced incident report
(excluding .dat1 ﬁles, .ini ﬁles and empty folders) in .7z
format using ultra compression.
5.2. TR3Secure
From a forensics practice perspective TR3Secure in-
cludes the desirable functionality as it provides the ﬁrst
responder with the capability to set a) case identiﬁer, b)
analyst’s name, c) drive letter for the volume storing the
tools, d) drive letter for the volume to store the collection
data, e) current date and time. Additionally it logs every
step of the triage process apart from the produced errors
and it runs through a single command shell window,
allowing the examiner to observe any occurring errors.
5.3. Kludge 3.20110223
Kludge collects digital evidence that the other two tools
do not. First of all, it collects internet browsers history from
Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer, which can be proven
very useful if, for example, the examiner is working on a
case relating to a plethora of common offenses such as
grooming, bullying, spam, and so forth. Additionally, it
collects antivirus logs and reports on the ﬁrewall state.
Furthermore, it collects process dumps and process-related
memory for each running process.
From a forensics perspective Kludge creates timelines of
system activity by using ﬂs. This functionality can be useful
for the examiner, as this type of triage report “gives an
investigator clues regarding where to probe further”.4 Finally,
Kludge produces an html ﬁle, through which the investi-
gator can navigate the collected digital evidence. This4 http://wiki.sleuthkit.org/index.php?title¼Timelines.
Fig. 7. Kludge script execution.
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speeds up the triage process.
6. Drawbacks
None of the triage tools state in their manuals that the
examiner has to employ for all the tools the “Run as
administrator” function in Windows Vista, 7 and 8 oper-
ating system environments, as UAC prevents some pro-
grams, such as those that collect memory, from running
correctly.6.1. TriageIR 0.79
TriageIR presents some design errors that might be
caused by programming faults or incompatibility of the
utilities the tool uses in various operating systems. First of
all, the tool does not collect any Netbios information, as the
Nbtstat command utilized by the tool for this speciﬁc
purpose seems to fail in all tested operating systems.
Additionally, the tool collects partial event log information
in Windows 7, 8 and XP 64-bit operating systems, as robo7
utility fails to copy .evtx ﬁles in Windows 7 and 8 due to
incompatibility, while the tool’s author seems to have not
catered for collecting event log ﬁles in Windows XP 64-bit
operating systems. Moreover, the tool does not collect the
security registry hive in Windows XP, as the operating
system does not allow the administrator to “navigate his
way through the HKLM\SECURITY hive”5 by default resulting
in the tool not being able to collect the hive in question due
to access restrictions. The tool does not record the hard
disk’s directory structure in Windows XP 64-bit, although
the command utilized (tree c:\ /f /a) is seemingly correct.
The tool also fails to collect, although so designed, various
information from the examined computer (hosts ﬁle, cur-
rent logon user, user logons and ﬁrewall conﬁguration).
This is due to the fact that the tool’s author has omitted to5 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry for information
on Registry in general and http://www.registryonwindows.com/registry-
security-1.php in regards to the HKLM\SECURITY hive in particular.call the functions collecting this information through the
tool’s GUI. In order to correct this omission, the author has
to a) create the appropriate checkboxes in the tool’s
graphical interface (through the tool’s TriageGUI()), b)
correlate the Firewall, Hosts and LoggedOn .ini settings
with the corresponding checkboxes in the tool’s GUI
(through the tool’s Ini2GUI()) and c) call the appropriate
functions (“Firewall”, “Hosts”, “LoggedOn”) through the
tool’s INI2Command(). It should be noted here that the
LoggedOn function calls the logonsessions utility by using
the command “logonsessions -accepteula c”, which is not
correctly syntaxed thus unable to execute. Furthermore,
the tool fails to collect Prefetch ﬁles in Windows 7 64-bit
with no service pack installed. The tool leverages the
command whoami to collect current user info. However,
this command does not function in Windows XP, unless
Windows XP SP2 support tools are installed. Lastly,
scheduled tasks data are not collected inWindows 8, as the
utilized AT command has been deprecated and the user is
advised by the operating system to use schtasks.exe
instead.
By inspecting the execution and results, the tool seemed
to violate a number of expectations on forensic soundness.
First of all the tool utilizes Sysinternal’s ntfsinfo utility to
record ntfs information. The utility requires as a parameter
a hard disk partition letter in order to operate. TriageIR
takes for granted that the examined windows partition
letter is c: and attempts to read ntfs info on that partition. If
Windows OS is not installed on the c: partition ntfsinfo will
not collect any ntfs information regarding the operating
system partition. The same applies to the usage of absolute
paths (C:\Users\, C:\Documents and Settings\) for the
collection of user proﬁles (USRClass.dat ﬁles), recent links,
jump lists, event logs and directory structure. Furthermore,
the tool adds registry keys required for the execution of the
Sysinternals tools but does not seem to undo these registry
alterations. Additionally it does not record all executed
commands in the created incident log ﬁle. As such, the
examiner is not in a position to know which commands
executed correctly, which failed and why. Traceability of
the execution becomes even more difﬁcult as the tool calls
a separate command shell for each utility invoked, which
Table 2
Tested tools – collected forensic artifacts vs. order of volatility scale.
Order of volatility (from more volatile to less volatile) Y TriageIR 0.79 TR3Secure Kludge 3.2
Registers and Cache No data collected X X X
Routing table, arp cache,
process table, kernel
statistics, memory
Network-related data/ ARP cache X X X
Network-related data/ Routing table X X
Network-related data/ DNS cache and resolution X
Network-related data/ DNS Information X X
Network-related data/ A records X
Network-related data/ Host ﬁle X
Network-related data/ Netbios routing table X X
Network-related data/ Netbios information (sessions,
connections, ﬁle transfer over netbios)
X X X
Network-related data/ Port to process mapping X
Network-related data/ TCP/UDP active connections X X X
Network-related data/ TTL X
Network-related data/ Firewall (info, status) X
Process data/ Process File Handles X X X
Process data/ Running Processes-DLLs X X X
Process data/ Services X
Process data/ Process to exe mapping X
Process data/ Process to user mapping X
Process data/ Child processes X
Process data/ Process dependencies X
Process data/Process dumps X
Process data/ Process memory X
User’s activity/ Active logon sessions X
User’s activity/ Logged on users X X X
User’s activity/ Recent ﬁles X
User’s activity/ Internet browsers history X
User’s activity/ Jump lists Files X
User’s activity/ Clipboard-contents X X
Registry hives/ Sam X X
Registry hives/ Security X X
Registry hives/ System X X
Registry hives/ Software X X
Registry hives/ HKCU X X
Registry hives/ NTUSER.dat X X
Registry hives/ USRCLASS.dat X X
Various timelines/ IE Timeline X
Various timelines/ FF Timeline X
Various timelines/ Hard disk timeline X
Various timelines/ Prefetch info X
Various timelines/ Recycle Bin timeline and contents X
Memory image X
System conﬁguration/ VSS service status X
Prefetch ﬁles X X
NTFS data streams X X
UnSigned-executables/ Uptime X
Temporary ﬁle systems System event logs/ evt ﬁles X X
System event logs/ evtx ﬁles X
Processed event logs/ System X X
Processed event logs/ Security X X
Processed event logs/ Application event logs X X
Antivirus logs X
No data collected X
Disk Remote logging and
monitoring data that
is relevant to the
system in question
Not applicable X X X
Network-related data/ Open shared ﬁles X
User’s activity/ Remotely logged on users X
User’s activity/ Remote users IP-addresses X
No data collected X
Physical conﬁguration,
network topology
Network-related data/ Network conﬁguration X X
Network-related data/ Network Adapter info X
Network-related data/ Routing table X X
Network-related data/ Host File X X
Network-related data/ Enabled network protocols X
Network-related data/ Promiscuous adapters X
User’s activity/ Logged on users X
System conﬁguration/ User accounts policy X
System conﬁguration/ User groups X
System conﬁguration/ Startup information X X
System conﬁguration/ Directory structure X
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued )
Order of volatility (from more volatile to less volatile) Y TriageIR 0.79 TR3Secure Kludge 3.2
System conﬁguration/ Mounted disks information X
System conﬁguration/ Hostname X
System conﬁguration/ Local shares X X
System conﬁguration/ Schedule tasks X X
System conﬁguration/ Kernel build X
System conﬁguration/ Register organization
and owner
X
System conﬁguration/ OS-version X
System conﬁguration/ Group policy listing and RSOP X
System conﬁguration/ Installed software X
System conﬁguration/ Security settings X
System conﬁguration/ Hardware devices X
System conﬁguration/ Number of processors
and their type
X
System conﬁguration/ Amount of physical memory X
System conﬁguration/ System’s install date X
System conﬁguration/ System variables X
System conﬁguration/ System conﬁguration X
System conﬁguration/ Firewall conﬁguration X
System conﬁguration/ Services X
System conﬁguration/ Type of installation X
System conﬁguration/ NTFS partition info X
Certain applications/ Version and Signing
info for Acrobat
X
Certain applications/ Acrobat Reader X
Certain applications/ Flash X
Certain applications/ Java X
Certain applications/ Firefox X
Certain folders structure/ Program Files X
Certain folders structure/ Documents and Settings X
Certain folders structure/Windows X
UnSigned-Executables/ Computer name X
UnSigned-Executables/ Autoruns X
UnSigned-Executables/ Startup apps X
UnSigned-Executables/ BHO’s X
UnSigned-Executables/ Hotﬁxes and service packs X





UnSigned-Executables/ Drive Information X
UnSigned-Executables/ Partition info X
UnSigned-Executables/ Users X
UnSigned-Executables/ USB device history X
Registry ﬁles X
Archival media Not applicable X X X
S. Shiaeles et al. / Digital Investigation 10 (2013) 99–115108vanishes after execution resulting in the examiner not
being able to inspect the produced errors. However,
although TriageIR creates MD5 hashes of the evidence ﬁles,
it does not produce similar hashes for all the reports (ex.
ARP Info, Network Connections, etc.), which are created
during execution. This can be justiﬁed in part, as these re-
ports are not reproducible (in a second execution some of
these reports will entail different information). However, it
is our belief that the tool should create also hashes of the
reports, in order to be able to maintain a proper chain of
custody for all digital evidence collected or produced by the
tool. Finally, if the tool’s compression functionality is used,
certain items (.dat1 and .ini ﬁles) are not collected.6.2. TR3Secure
The tool exhibited a number of errors during execution.
The most serious one was that it seems to run smoothly on
32-bit operating systems but it fails on 64-bit OS as some ofits tools, including the one that images the memory, are
built for 32-bit OS. For example, pv.exe is used to map
running processes to executables, but, when run on a 64-bit
OS environment, it seems to map only 32-bit running
processes. In Windows 7 64-bit the tool could not ﬁnd the
path of the “tools” folder, thus certain variables must be
deﬁned, in order for the tool to execute correctly.
The tool, when run in OS that use a different codepage
(Greek codepage 737 for example) produces text ﬁles that
need to be viewed with speciﬁc viewer (for example with
Wordpad), in order for the results to be viewable.6.3. Kludge 3.20110223
Kludge presents some out-of-the-box errors that may
have been caused by programming faults or in-
compatibility of the utilities the tool invokes in various
operating systems. First of all, the Hobocopy utility which
Kludge utilizes for copying certain ﬁles, crashed in
Table 3
Tool effectiveness.
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to event logs and registry ﬁles not been collected. It ap-
pears that the version included in Kludge downloadable
package is old and, according to the utility’s website, is
destined for Windows XP 32-bit systems. In order to run
the Hobocopy utility in Windows 7 and Windows 8 OS
(32-bit and 64-bit versions) we had to replace the version
in question with a version that supports Windows 7 and 8
and also install Microsoft Visual Cþþ 2010 Redis-
tributable Package in order for the utility to execute and
produce the desired results.
Additionally, “At.exe”, “Netstat.exe”, “Ifconﬁg.exe”,
“Arp.exe”, “Route.exe”, “Net.exe” and “Streams.exe” utilities
invoked by Kludge in Windows 7 and 8 OS, (32-bit and 64-
bit versions) crashed as these tools depend on netapi32.dll
architecture, which is different in Windows 7 and 8 sys-
tems. Also, thewmic utility which parses mof ﬁles, does not
execute in the aforementioned operating systems. More-
over, Kludgemay collect AV logs, which is an advantage, but
it collects speciﬁc AV logs (Symantec Antivirus Corporate
Edition 7.5, Symantec Endpoint Protection, McAfee\Vir-
usScan, McAfee\MSC). This is a drawback that limits this
useful functionality as Symantec and McAffee share only
15% of the antivirus market (OPSWAT, 2012). This means
that in at least 85% of the cases Kludge will collect no
antivirus logs. It also reinforces the fact that the ﬁrst
responder must be fully aware of the capabilities and lim-
itations of the triage tool he decides to employ. Addition-
ally, Kludge does not collect .evtx ﬁles, which means that
the tool does not acquire event logs in Windows Vista, 7
and 8 OS. With regards to forensic practices, the tool does
not keep a detailed log of the utilities invoked making it
difﬁcult to check which utilities/commands were actually
executed during the triage process.Table 4
Summary of ﬁle system and registry modiﬁcations.
OS Tool
TriageIR TR3Sec
Win XP SP3 FMa: 39 (mainly prefetch and /system32/CatRoot) FM: 13
RC: 33 RC: 21
Win 7 64 b FM: 84 (mainly prefetch and logﬁles) FM: 4
RC: 379 RC: 71
Win 7 FM: 39 (prefetch and user appdata) FM: 26
RC: 134 RC: 13
Win 8 64 b FM: 138 (prefetch and user appdata) FM: 45
RC: 354 RC: 73
Win 8 FM: 29 (prefetch and user appdata) FM: 19
RC: 131 RC: 12
a FM: File creations/modiﬁcations – RC: Registry changes.Another peculiar feature of Kludge is that it is designed
to run only remotely through administrative shares.
Therefore, in order to collect data from a remote machine,
administrative shares must be enabled in Windows oper-
ating systems. Another important issue is that Kludge up-
loads its tools to the remote machine in c:\Windows\Temp\
folder in a zipped format ﬁle and then unzips them, in
order to execute them by using the wmic utility. The re-
sults, including the system’s memory dump, are saved in
the same folder. Provided that nowadays computer systems
have at least 2 GB of RAM the examined system would
signiﬁcantly be altered. In addition and similar with Tri-
ageIR, the tool does not remove upon completion the reg-
istry keys it adds to the system; these registry keys relate to
the execution and functionality of the Sysinternals utilities.
7. Adherence to ACPO Principle 2
Triage is inevitably linkedwith accessing theoriginaldata
from a live system. The admissibility safeguard captured by
Principle 2 suggests that the investigators accessing the live
system should be competent enough and capable of
explaining the relevance and implications of their actions.
Consequently the investigators’ competence would also be
related to their understanding on how the triage tool in-
terferes and disturbs the conﬁguration, states of the live
systemand theunderlying data. In the following subsections
wehighlight thebehaviorof the tools examined in thispaper.
7.1. TriageIR 0.79
TriageIR modiﬁes the hard disk of the system pertaining
to the operating system it is executed in. As the tool invokes
its repertoire of utilities items relating to the actualure Kludge (modiﬁed version)
(one in /system32/) FM: 0
RC: 4
(mainly logﬁles) FM: 1 (temp appdata)
RC: 6
(mostly in prefetch, one in /system32/) FM: 1 (temp appdata)
1 RC: 14
(mostly in /INF folder) FM: 0
RC: 6
(2 in /system32/) FM: 1 (temp appdata)
7 RC: 8
S. Shiaeles et al. / Digital Investigation 10 (2013) 99–115110Windows OS functionality, such as Prefetch, recent ﬁles,
jump lists ﬁles (Windows 7 and Windows 8), Cryptne-
tUrlCache and temp folders, are altered. The same applies to
registry keys, which are altered or added. In Windows
XP SP3 32-bit, wbem logs (C\WINDOWS\system32\
WBEM\Logs) are altered, whereas in Windows XP, 7 64 bit
(SP1 and no SP1), 8 (32-bit and 64-bit) the event logs folder
is altered. In caseswhere a utility crashes (Windows 764-bit
and 8 64-bit), appcrash reports are created in a speciﬁc
folder (C:\users\all users\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Re-
portArchive\). In all Windows OS versions, exceptWindows
7 64-bit SP2, ﬁles are created in the C\Window-
s\system32\CatRoot2\ folder, while the tool loads, in all
Windows OS, a Sysinternals driver named “PRO-
CEXP152.SYS”. Similarly, the tool loads in all Windows OS
drivers named “win32dd.sys” or “win64dd.sys”, in order to
image the memory using the win32dd or win64dd utilities.
In all operating systems, triageIR creates a “commands.log”
ﬁle in thewindows drive,which contains a limited log of the
executed commands.
Against the above discussion, we conclude that all
modiﬁcations are justiﬁable, of a limited extent and can be
explained and eventually defended in court.
7.2. TR3Secure
TR3Secure presents an almost consistent behavior in all
operating systems it is executed in. Similar to TriageIR, the
utilities invoked byTR3Secure result to alteringWindowsOS
components such as Prefetch ﬁles. This also appears in some
cases (Windows XP, Windows 7 64-bit – SP and no SP -,
Windows 8 32- and 64-bit) with temp and recent activity
ﬁles. In all operating systems TR3Secure loads drivers
(sysinternals’ PROCEXP141.SYS, mandiant tools driver,
Nirsoftopened ﬁles driver) in certain folders (c:\window-
s\system32\drivers, C:\Windows\SysWOW64\), alters or
adds registry keys, creates or modiﬁes C:\Window-
s\WindowsUpdate.log andmodiﬁes C:\WINDOWS\Software
Distribution\ folder. InWindows7and8,whereutilities such
as “uptime” and “pslist” fail to execute, appcrash reports are
created in speciﬁc folders (C:\users\all users\Micro-
soft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\ and C:\users\user\-
AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\).
Finally in Windows 8, folder C:\Windows\INF\ is modiﬁed.
Similar to TriageIR, we conclude that all modiﬁcations
are justiﬁable, of a limited extent and can be explained and
eventually defended in court.
7.3. Kludge 3.20110223
Kludge network edition does not respect ACPO Principle
2 because the changes that it makes to the examined sys-
tem are extensive, as incident data and called utilities are
ﬁrstly written in the C:\Windows\Temp folder of the sys-
tem under investigation. Considering that modern com-
puter systems have at least 512 MB, more than 512 MBs are
written to the hard disk of the examined system, as Kludge
executes. Thus, although themodiﬁcations to the examined
system are explainable, they are not justiﬁable and thus not
acceptable. However the modiﬁed version of Kludge, re-
spects Principle 2.In detail, in all operating systems Kludge alters or adds
registry keys, creates ﬁles in C\Windows\system32\Cat-
Root2\ folder, attempts to create at least one driver
(sysinternals PROCEXP.SYS) in certain folders (c:\window-
s\system32\drivers, C:\Windows\SysWOW64\) and mod-
iﬁes Prefetch as well as the users’ recent activity and temp
ﬁles. In Windows 7 family appcrash reports are created in
speciﬁc folder (C:\users\all users\Microsoft\Windows\
WER\ReportArchive\) as speciﬁc utilities (hobocopy and
streams) called by Kludge fail.
8. Suggestions
The triage tools need to have two types of dynamically
adjusting behavior:
1. Before the acquisition in order to operate correctly and
minimize the risks of errors. This is similar to the make
conﬁg command in Linux systems, which inspects the
variables, paths and other dependencies in a system.
2. During execution, in order to maximize their effective-
ness and purpose. For example, forking of unrelated
utilities not affecting one another may reduce the triage
period. In addition, the invocation of utilities could be
modiﬁed depending on the acquired data (for example if
a suspicious network connection is discovered it may be
worthwhile to also capture the trafﬁc).
By observing the behavior of the three tools it seems
that disabling Prefetch on Windows systems is a highly
advised action since this will result to less system alter-
ations. This can be achieved bymodifying the registry value
controlling Prefetch, and upon completion the tool must
restore the registry key to its’ original value (see Appendix
B). Registry modiﬁcations when done in a controlled
manner are more easily justiﬁable than alterations caused
when Prefetch is enabled and such tradeoff seems to be
unquestionable. Additionally, the execution speed of
robocopy can be increased by using the “XJ” switch (“ex.
robocopy.exe %sys_drive% %vol_outpath%\preserved-win-
dowspartitionlog-ﬁles\ *.evt *.log *.evtx /S /ZB /copy:-
DATSOU /r:1 /w:1 /ts /FP /np /XJ”) to exclude junctions from
the robocopy ﬁle collection, as junctions might lead to
creation of nested triage data. Furthermore, it is suggested
that the tools keep a detailed log of all actions performed
including, if possible, errors produced during execution, as
traceability of the tools’ execution is a very important part
of the forensic process. Moreover, it is recommended that
the tools record and undo all registry changes, which they
knowingly perform to the examined system.
It is also advisable that all triage tools include func-
tionality for collecting internet activity artifacts (history,
cookies, archived passwords, etc.) pertaining to all known
browsers.
8.1. TriageIR 0.79
The tool is not Windows 8-ready. Additionally, the tool
must have been designed with a speciﬁc environment in
mind as it predicts triage collection (for speciﬁc evidence
items) in the specialized winxpe OS environment (destined
S. Shiaeles et al. / Digital Investigation 10 (2013) 99–115 111to “enable rapid development of the most reliable and full-
featured connected devices”) but not in Windows XP 64-bit.
8.2. TR3Secure
The tool needs to be adjusted in order to be better
compatible with Windows 64bit OS, thus it is recom-
mended that the code is modiﬁed and more utilities are
included, which will cover the 64 bit OS aspect. Addition-
ally, the tool will beneﬁt if it is modiﬁed in order to be able
to collect registry ﬁles, scheduled tasks, peripherals,
installed printers, user logons and internet activity artifacts.
8.3. Kludge 3.20110223
The tool was built for speciﬁc situations, which’s why it
searches for certain Antivirus products and why the author
of the tool has commented certain lines of code which
point out to rootkit scan with Sophos Anti-rootkit and
GMER. Additionally, the tool must be modiﬁed, in order for
it to run from a USB stick or an external drive and save the
results there. Moreover, some tools need to be replaced in
order to run in Windows 7 and 8.
9. Discussion and future work
We empirically conﬁrmed that by far there is no silver
bullet for an all-purpose, highly effective, robust triage tool.
Such conclusion was intuitively expected due to the high
variety and complexity of modern computer systems. As
the complexity is not expected to decrease, and variety in
the users’ needs and user practices in terms of software and
processes will tend to be pluralistic, we recommend the
following considerations a ﬁrst responder should include in
order to manage risk and handle uncertainty surrounding a
triage phase:
 Maintain a proﬁle of the capabilities of the tools. This
proﬁle can consist of a number of qualitative and
quantitative metrics and will assist the responder to
select the most appropriate tool for the occasion
through an informed decision. From the empirical study
of the three tools, we propose the following metrics:
B Effectiveness. This refers to the effectiveness metric
introduced in Section 4 and captures the ability of the
tool to collect a large variety of different incident data.
This can be either a qualitative (i.e. on an ordinal
descriptive scale of “low”/“medium”/“high”) or a
quantitative metric (number of types of evidence
collected as a percentage of a total number of evidence).
B (Un)reliability. This metric refers to the amount of er-
rors the tool produces. This can be quantitative and
described by two values, the mean of the percentages
of failed utility executions to total number of execu-
tions, and the standard deviation. This metric can be
further speciﬁed by OS.
B Invariability. Invariability shows whether the tool be-
haves consistently across different systems. This can be
a result of a statistical test.
Some intuitive relations may exist between themetrics. For
example, it is expected that an effective and highly reliabletool will have low invariability, since in order for it to have
an outstanding performance with a particular OS it will not
perform as well when applied to other operating systems.
Relationships and utilization strategies of these metrics are
part of our future research.
 One of the advantages of using open source tools is that
the ﬁrst responder will have the opportunity to prepare
well in advance by modifying himself the tool, in order
to ﬁt his needs. This would be particularly useful if there
is detailed advanced knowledge on the systems to be
seized andmay help overcome potential limitations (say
a limited RAM in an embedded system, prohibiting the
use of a large tool). However, it should be highlighted
that this will require a signiﬁcant amount of program-
ming knowledge on the tool’s software technology.
Open source approaches are a double-edge sword;
although they give a signiﬁcant amount of control to the
user, the ﬁnal product may not have been extensively
tested and veriﬁed for various errors that can lead to
catastrophic situations during a triage exercise. In any
case, the competent examiner must modify the tool
keeping in mind a list of desirable properties and char-
acteristics the tool should maintain (see for example the
work by Mislan et al. (2010) for a comprehensive list of
requirements for triage inspection tools).
Another point is the need of having a portfolio of triage
tools, for the reason that some tools may be recognized as
viruses from the installed antivirus software and as such
their execution may be hindered. In situations where the
execution of a triage tool is affected by the antivirus, the
ﬁrst responder’s alternatives are: a) disable the antivirus
software, b) use a different tool and c) have an obfuscated
version of the tool. Alternative (a) would be the preferable
alternative in most situations as the changes to the suspect
system can be well documented (ACPO Principles 2 and 3)
and at the same time the most preferable to the ﬁrst
responder tool will be employed. We consider alternative
(c) to be the least preferable action because it requires a
higher degree of preparation. In addition, despite the fact
that there are obfuscation tools that trivially transform the
executable code to another congruent form, yet there is no
guarantee that the code will be fully compatible with the
original one and that it will still not be detected by the
antivirus.
In our future research effort we plan to revisit the tools
and assess them from a usefulness and quality perspective,
to determine if the triage data collected are immediately
exploitable by the examiner and if they provide valuable
information on a case-by-case basis. Subsequently, our goal
is to build our own triage tool that combines useful func-
tionality from all three tested tools and produces, in a case-
by-case basis, results that enhance the triage process.
Appendix A. Modiﬁcations and improvements
performed on the triage tools
A.1. Kludge
This tool is designed to run remotely to target host using
administrative shares. We modiﬁed the script, in order to
S. Shiaeles et al. / Digital Investigation 10 (2013) 99–115112run it locally. It can be downloaded from http://isir.ee.duth.
gr/?p¼243.
A.2. TR3Secure
We performed the following modiﬁcations:
 In line 179 (“tools\robocopy.exe %WINDIR%\Prefetch %
c_drive%:\Data-%case%\%computername%-%timestamp
%\preserved-prefetch-ﬁles\Prefetch\ /ZB /copy:DTSOU /r:4
/w:1 /ts /FP /np /log:%c_drive%:\Data-%case%\%computer-
name%-%timestamp%\preserved-prefetch-ﬁles\pretch-
robocopy-log.txt)”) the tool was missing a robocopy copy
parameter and it had an unneeded parentheses in the
end of the command. The correct command would be
“tools\robocopy.exe %WINDIR%\Prefetch %c_drive%:\Data-
%case%\%computername%-%timestamp%\preserved-pre-
fetch-ﬁles\Prefetch\ /ZB /copy:DATSOU /r:4 /w:1 /ts /FP /npAppendix B. Suggestions
The following .bat script excerpt will disable Prefetch prior to
the TR3Secure triage tool. In other triage tools, the excerpt need/log:%c_drive%:\Data-%case%\%computername%-%time-
stamp%\preserved-prefetch-ﬁles\pretch-robocopy-log.txt”.
We modiﬁed the line in question.
 In line 271 the command should be “tools\pv.exe -e>> %
vol_outpath%\ProcessInfo_2_process-to-exe-mapping.txt”
and not “tools\pvc.exe -e >> %vol_outpath%\ProcessInfo
_2_process-to-exe-mapping.txt”. We modiﬁed the com-
mand accordingly.
 in lines 273–281 the Currprocess tool runs as CPro-
cess.exe (when downloaded) not currprocess.exe. We
replaced all occurrences of currprocess.exe with
cprocess.exe.
 In windows 7 64 bit the tool could not ﬁnd the path of
the “tools” folder, thus we had to add the following
parameters:
SET mypath¼%wdp0
%mypath:w0,1%running any triage tool. The excerpt can be ported, as is, in
s to be adjusted accordingly.
S. Shiaeles et al. / Digital Investigation 10 (2013) 99–115 113Appendix C. Forensic soundness and impact of tools
The following representative excerpts were extracted
from the sandbox analyzer reports. Multiple entries are
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